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Abstract: The regulation of microfinance services is likely to have a wide-ranging influence on the
microfinance sector, particularly on institutions and their clients. This paper reveals the impact
of a specific regulatory regime, the “Microcredit Regulatory Authority Act, 2006”, enacted by
the Bangladesh government to monitor and supervise nonprofit nongovernment organizations
(NGOs). We analyzed survey and interview data provided by clients of both nonprofit microfinance
institutions (MFIs) registered under the Act and nonprofit institutions that are unregistered, all lending
only to women. Client-level analysis using fixed effects for specific MFI membership is applied,
focusing on the role of regulation by comparing protections as consumers of financial intermediations
in terms of financial literacy, awareness, and status of clients of registered and unregistered MFIs.
We found compelling evidence of a positive association between the financial status, financial literacy,
and financial awareness of clients of registered MFIs, but not unregistered MFIs. These findings
support the need for MFIs to implement consumer protection measures and inform their consumers
about key issues to achieve improved client outcomes.
Keywords: consumer protection; nongovernment organization; regulation; microfinance; consumer
awareness; Bangladesh
1. Introduction
Despite the long history of microfinance (Gatto 2018), in the last decade regulatory issues within the
microfinance sector have received considerable attention from multilateral development organizations
(e.g., the Asian Development Bank, The World Bank, United Nations), central banks, and governments
of both developed and developing countries (Islam and Mamun 2011). In that context, with the largest
microfinance sector in the world, the government of Bangladesh passed the “Microcredit Regulatory
Authority Act, 2006” to, amongst other things, improve governance practices within nongovernment
organization (NGO) microfinance institutions (MFIs) (hereafter NGO-MFIs) for the welfare of their
clients (Microcredit Regulatory Authority 2010). In a Bangladesh context, MFIs focus almost exclusively
on poor women, and it is women who make the best microcredit recipients (Drago and Gatto 2018).
Microcredit represents a powerful tool to enhance livelihoods, reduce poverty and increase
financial inclusion for those without the collateral that provides access to lending by conventional
financial institutions. Women, despite being highly vulnerable, especially in Bangladesh where the
World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum (WEF) (2020)) reveals a
rank of 141 from 153 countries in terms of Economic Participation and Opportunity, have been found
to utilize microfinance loans more beneficially for family resilience than males (Dzanku 2019) and
also to exhibit higher relative repayment rates (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010; D’Espallier et al. 2011;
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Shahriar et al. 2020). This latter feature is thought to be due to the innate trustworthiness and
collaboration developed within female groups by the social capital inherent in the group lending
model adopted by many MFIs, including in Bangladesh (Berge et al. 2016; Shahriar et al. 2020).
Given the effectiveness of microfinance in reducing poverty, facilitating entrepreneurship,
and enhancing financial and social inclusion, it is important that organizations servicing these vulnerable
clients act with propriety and probity and are financially sustainable. Previous studies have claimed
that the need for regulation and supervision of MFIs arises from several considerations. These include
protecting the interests of small depositors, ensuring proper terms of credit, financial discipline,
and educating consumers so that they are aware of their rights (Ahmed 2013; Akash et al. 2010;
Bakker et al. 2014; Baten 2009; Charitonenko and Rahman 2002; Jackson and Islam 2005; Miah 2006;
Rahman and Luo 2012; Rashid 2010; Yuge 2011). Brix and McKee (2010) argued that as competition
increased, MFIs and their clients have faced a variety of consumer protection challenges, including
pricing transparency, appropriate product sales techniques and collection practices, incentives for
client over-indebtedness, and poor client financial literacy. Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2017) supported
the need to improve MFI consumers’ awareness (knowledge about their rights and financial literacy),
especially of the risks involved in over-indebtedness. Wickramasinghe and Fernando (2017) argued that
education of microcredit users is needed to deter borrowing for income and consumption smoothing
and encourage use of funds for income generation. Murendo and Mutsonziwa (2017) found that
greater financial literacy positively influenced saving through MFIs.
Cohen (2013, p. 179) editorialized that “ . . . financial literacy, financial education, and financial
capability . . . are seen by many as integral parts of the financial inclusion agenda”. He went on to say
that the “ . . . sudden rise of personal financial management capabilities, however, should not blind us to
the reality that this is a nascent field and [we] still have much to learn about not only good practice but
also what is measurable in terms of impact”. Consistent with Huston (2010) and Sayinzoga et al. (2016),
we define financial literacy as consumers’ awareness, skills, and knowledge, enabling them to make
informed, effective decisions about financial resources. Nawaz (2015) concluded that client awareness
(financial literacy) is more important than access to credit itself, and should be the focus of all
future microfinance programs, consistent with MFIs playing an important role in social development
(Jha 2016; D’Espallier et al. 2016). However, client awareness and protection remain comparatively
under-researched in developing countries (Sayinzoga et al. 2016; Islam and Simpson 2018). This study
responds to this lack of research and examines the role of regulation in encouraging microfinance client
awareness about their rights and protection of consumers by MFIs.
This research is focused on whether the registration of nonprofit MFIs under the Bangladesh
“Microcredit Regulatory Authority Act, 2006” (Microfinance Regulatory Authority Act 2006) (hereafter
MRA Act-2006) is associated positively with enhancing MFI clients’ financial awareness or their
financial status. To investigate this issue, we gained permission from both registered and unregistered1
NGO-MFIs and their exclusively female clients to participate in highly structured interviews during a
period after the implementation of the MRA Act-2006.
The findings provided strong evidence that clients’ financial status is positively associated with
their awareness and that the financial literacy of clients of regulated MFIs is higher than that of clients
of unregulated MFIs. Given the findings, this paper provides insight and contribution by assisting
policymakers, governments, and donors to better understand the microfinance sector, and to potentially
make decisions more effectively in the interests of consumer protection.
1.1. Background
Although it continues to improve, Bangladesh has one of the lowest per capita income levels
in the world (The World Bank 2018). The microfinance sector in Bangladesh has undergone four
1 In this study, the terms “regulated” and “unregulated” are used synonymously with the terms “registered” and “unregistered”.
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distinct development phases: the “Action phase” in the 1970s, the “Microcredit Development phase”
in the 1980s, the “Consolidation phase” in the 1990s, and the “Expansion phase” from 2000 onwards
(Bedson 2009). Significant growth in microfinance saw Bangladesh host the then largest microfinance
sector in the world. However, in the absence of any form of accountability to the government or any
other authority, particularly for nonprofit NGO-MFIs in the country, significant challenges were present
with issues related to consumer protection, institutional transparency, outreach, and sustainability
(Alamgir 2009; Bedson 2009).
Various authorities, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, started thinking
about the need for an appropriate regulatory framework for the nonprofit NGO-MFI sector from the
mid-1990s (Alamgir 2009; Rashid 2010). The sustainability of the industry from both the government’s
perspective and in terms of the environmental, social, and economic sustainability of the NGO-MFIs
themselves was likely to have been an important consideration (Rusciano et al. 2019). Action came
in the form of the MRA Act-2006, which established the Microcredit Regulation Authority (MRA)
as the regulatory and supervisory body with oversight of the sector. The core mission of the
MRA is to ensure the transparency and accountability of microfinance operations of NGO-MFIs
(Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA) (2011)). All MFIs that met the required loan portfolio (BDT
4 million) and number of borrowers (1000) were to be registered or cease to operate by March 2010.
1.2. Clients’ Awareness and Financial Literacy in a Microfinance Context
Clients’ financial awareness and the protection of their rights are critical to the objectives of
microfinance programs. However, MFI clients are often unaware of their rights as consumers, including,
for instance, their rights to privacy, to know the terms and conditions of their loans and interest
rate, or the debt collection policies of their MFI (Perdomo 2008). This lack of knowledge is not
unusual even in more conventional banking contexts (e.g., (Lee et al. 2019)). Many clients do not
even expect transparency or accountability to be fundamental components of their financial rights
(Chaudhury and Matin 2002). However, it is well-known that financial literacy training culminates in
greater financial inclusion (Bongomin et al. 2017), greater savings and borrowing, increased likelihood
of starting new income-generating activities (Sayinzoga et al. 2016), and improvement in repayment
rates and productive use of loans (Epstein and Yuthas 2017), although it does not necessarily mitigate
over-indebtedness (Schicks 2014).
Examples exist of the abuse, mistreatment, and exploitation of loan collection concerning poor,
vulnerable clients in Bangladesh (Banerjee and Jackson 2017; Maîtrot 2018). Banerjee and Jackson (2017)
found incidences of client abuse, humiliation, and malpractice by microfinance loan officers and
their employees. Banerjee and Jackson (2017) found that MFIs in Bangladesh often use aggressive
loan recovery strategies that cause humiliation and disrespect, and de-motivate clients to repay.
Maîtrot (2018) found that clients with regular repayments faced forceful loan renewal, terming this as
“practice drift” by MFI field staff, as distinct from “mission drift” at the head office level. There have
also been instances of fraud and misappropriation of clients’ deposits (Jackson and Islam 2005).
Compounding the problem is that financial literacy is very low in Bangladesh (Khalily and Miah 2015;
Khalily 2016). Both strong consumer protection and client awareness and financial literacy are necessary
to safeguard the interests of MFI clients from the adverse effects of undesirable practices by financial
intermediaries (Rozas et al. 2011).
There are two strong key rationales for proper monitoring and regulation of the nonprofit
NGO-Microfinance sector. First, from a client-centered perspective, to safeguard clients from all forms
of abuse and protect their rights. Second, from an institutional perspective, to improve the governance
and accountability of microfinance operations. This article investigates whether there is a difference in
female clients’ financial literacy and awareness of their rights in a financial context when dealing with
their institutions, contingent on the regulatory status of their MFI.
Section 2 provides a review of the literature on regulation in a microfinance context. Section 3
discusses the normative expectations of consumer protection specific to microfinance; it is followed by
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Section 4, where hypotheses are developed. In Section 5, the data gathering and analysis methods
utilized are explained. Sections 6 and 7 report the results and draw conclusions, respectively.
2. Theoretical Development and Prior Literature
In terms of theory, the MRA’s actions can be explained by the theory of change, which asserts that
interventions can lead to desired results (Gertler et al. 2011). The actions can also be explained by the
public interest theory of regulation that argues interventions are necessary when a market failure exists
in order to benefit the public interest (Deegan 2014). In terms of MFI client literacy, Thaler (1985) theory
of mental accounting shows that individuals think about their financial decisions in terms of budgets
for various mental expense categories, but not in terms of interest rates and the time value of money.
Several studies (e.g., (Rashid 2010; Jackson and Islam 2005; Miah 2006; Rahman and Luo 2012;
Ahmed 2013; Akash et al. 2010; Yuge 2011; Charitonenko and Rahman 2002; Baten 2009)) examined the
microfinance sector in terms of registration requirements, financial reserve requirements, agreement
with prudential accounting norms, and guidelines and supervision of operations and reporting systems,
among other aspects. These studies mostly emphasized the significance and normative requirements
of supervision and regulation of the sector. However, scant scholarly research exists on the role of
regulation in its association with client outcomes, with industry reports more common.
Some studies that fall under the theme of MFIs and client financial literacy focused on women’s
empowerment and client protection (Beltran 2007; Brix and McKee 2010; Cheston and Kuhn 2002;
Herman 2012; Kline and Sadhu 2011; Lee et al. 2019). A number of studies (Ghosh et al. 2014;
Kalra et al. 2015; Rozas et al. 2011; Tiwari et al. 2008) examined issues concerning clients’ financial
literacy in terms of MFI offerings. While the majority of these studies had a similar focus on the
importance of client protection and training, only two (Ghosh et al. 2014; Tiwari et al. 2008) highlighted
the importance of regulation of MFIs.
In an industry report, Ghosh et al. (2014) used qualitative interview data to examine the impact on
clients of MFI regulation by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Interviews were conducted with clients,
executives, and employees of MFIs, and representatives of three banks as lenders to MFIs. Nine MFIs
and their clients were interviewed during 2010–2011. The findings showed that external regulation of
MFIs’ governance not only ensured proper monitoring of and accountability, but also ensured that all
stakeholders’ interests were taken into account. Ghosh et al. (2014) suggested that regulation of MFIs is
important for their clients’ financial literacy, health, and education, and most crucially, the knowledge
and skills required in exercising the clients’ rights and responsibilities as consumers.
Tiwari et al. (2008) examined—in two phases, for 299 and 40 clients of two MFIs, separately—clients’
understanding of their loan contracts and assessed the implications of this understanding for policy.
The findings showed that small borrowers could identify their loan size, loan duration, and weekly
installments. However, they had a poor understanding of their loan interest rate or total interest
expense. Troublingly, most clients found what are commonly viewed as coercive collection practices to
be acceptable. The results indicated that clients think about their loans in terms of how much they owe
weekly. Tiwari et al. (2008) observed that a top–down regulatory approach incorrectly assumes that
all borrowers can calculate and understand their loan and interest rates. However, the study did not
differentiate between regulated and unregulated MFIs or their clients.
Kalra et al. (2015) developed a financial awareness index to measure the awareness and skills of
MFI clients. The index scored financial awareness education and knowledge of loans and insurance
for clients from four Indian MFIs. The index also evaluated clients’ financial, product analysis,
and computing skills. The findings showed that clients of one MFI were more aware of their rights and
the products offered compared to clients of the other three MFIs. The MFIs that provided training
and educated their clients about financial and business matters scored better than MFIs offering no
training. The results indicated that MFIs could play a significant role in increasing the awareness and
knowledge of their clients concerning issues falling under consumer protection.
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In terms of industry reports, Rozas et al. (2011) and Bansal et al. (2013) reported on the extent
to which seven client protection principles developed in 2008 under a worldwide sector initiative
known as the “Smart Campaign” have been implemented successfully. Since then, a subsequent report
acknowledged the need to tailor this campaign to the stage of development of microfinance in each
country (Shinozaki et al. 2017). By 2013, over 3900 endorsers of the initiative existed, coming from
130 countries, and including 1359 MFIs. The seven client protection principles they investigated
include: (i) MFIs and their clients should have adequate knowledge and understanding of appropriate
product design and delivery; (ii) prevention from over-indebtedness; (iii) transparency; (iv) appropriate
terms and conditions and responsible pricing; (v) fair and respectful treatment of clients; (vi) privacy
of client records; and (vii) proper mechanisms for complaint resolution.
Rozas et al. (2011) collected 479 independent third-party ratings2 of client protection practices
plus self-reported data covering 300 MFIs across 130 countries for 2008–2011. The results revealed that
a basic level of client protection performance was widespread in the governance practices of many
MFIs. On a scale of 1–5, the privacy of client data scored 4.4, prevention from over-indebtedness,
transparency, and fair and respectful treatment of clients each scored 3.8, mechanisms for complaint
resolution scored 3.7, and responsible pricing scored 3.5. Notably, poorer MFI performers were found
in Sub-Saharan Africa and East-Asia Pacific, and also amongst smaller MFIs in most countries.
Bansal et al. (2013) followed up and collected 58 MFI self-assessments and 18 external
assessments by Smart Accredited Assessors for 2011–2013. Findings based on the more objective
external assessments revealed weaknesses in two of the smart campaign principles: complaints
resolution and privacy of client data. Only half of the 18 MFIs had positive external assessments for
preventing over-indebtedness and transparency. However, strong practices were found for monitoring
over-indebtedness, offering product flexibility in terms of loan conditions, and sharing data with a
credit bureau. However, neither Rozas et al. (2011) nor Bansal et al. (2013) included MFI regulatory
status in their analyses.
3. Consumer Protection and Regulation in the Microfinance Sector
The MRA Act-2006 includes content on the “Rights of and responsibilities to nonprofit NGO-MFIs
and their clients”,3 and the MRA has published rules, guidelines, notices, and circulars since the
passage of the Act. These rules were circulated to all NGO-MFIs, whether they were registered or not.
Subsequently, the MRA published its most comprehensive circular/rules in November 2010. Some of
these rules relate to clients of NGO-MFIs, and include clauses on client protection, improving client
awareness of rights regarding their financial institutions, withdrawals, and adjustments to client
savings, knowledge and information about client savings, and clients’ duties.
4. Hypothesis Development
From the review of prior research, it can be seen that few studies accounted for the regulatory
status of MFIs of which clients are members. It is this omission that this study sought to address.
Bangladesh is ideally suited to this type of investigation since a clear delineation between regulated
and unregulated nonprofit NGO-MFIs followed the passage of the MRA Act-2006. The establishment
of the Authority, whether explained by the public interest theory of regulation (Deegan 2014) or the
theory of change (Gertler et al. 2011), has been argued to have encouraged MFIs to practice principles
of client protection. Furthermore, the issuance in 2010 of comprehensive rules and other guidance by
the Authority is likely to have influenced regulated MFIs more than unregulated MFIs to encourage
2 Third-party on-site evaluations included ratings by the specialized microfinance rating agencies MicroFinanza Rating
and PlanetRating; due diligence evaluations by the asset managers BlueOrchard, Incofin, Symbiotics, and Triple
Jump; and assessments conducted by the Smart Campaign itself. Beisland and Mersland (2012) review the drivers
of third-party ratings.
3 http://www.mra.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22&Itemid=40.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2020, 8, 63 6 of 24
the acquisition of financial literacy and awareness of their rights by clients. Given this, the following
hypothesis was developed:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Clients of regulated nonprofit, nongovernment organization microfinance institutions are
associated with higher financial literacy compared with clients of unregulated counterparts.
Clients of registered MFIs are expected to have higher financial literacy compared to clients of
unregistered MFIs; they are thus expected to be more in control of their financial status than clients of
unregistered MFIs. This premise leads to Hypotheses 2 and 3:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Clients of regulated nonprofit, nongovernment organization microfinance institutions are
associated with higher financial status than clients of unregulated counterparts.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Clients with higher rather than lower financial literacy are associated with higher
financial status.
To examine the role of regulation, Hypothesis 1 examines the relationship between clients’ financial
literacy and their NGO-MFIs’ status; that is, being a member of a regulated or unregulated NGO-MFI.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 examine, respectively, the relationship between client financial literacy and
NGO-MFI status (regulated/unregulated) and clients’ financial status.
5. Research Method
A structured interview guide constructed for a wider study, informed by the MRA Act-2006 and
MRA rules and guidelines, and translated into Bengali, was used by the first-named researcher to collect
primary data through face-to-face interviews with NGO-MFI clients. The interview guide, designed to
be suitable for respondents with little literacy, was validated by four high-level nonparticipant MFI
experts working in the field, three of which were from Bangladesh, and revised according to their
comments. Table 1 reports the final 12 structured questions to which participating NGO-MFI clients
were asked to respond anonymously. Demographic data were also collected.
5.1. Population and Sampling
In seeking cooperation from nonprofit NGO-MFIs and their clients, stratified random sampling
was used to select 89 NGO-MFIs from 651 (14 percent) that had operated since 2001 and had registered
with the MRA in 2006 or later. Additionally, the MIX Market (2012) and Credit Development Forum4
(Credit Development Forum (CDF) (2013)) databases were used to randomly select 605 then currently
operating unregistered MFIs operating since 20016.
This 10-year timeline was considered important in examining the impact of regulation on
NGO-MFI clients’ awareness of protection issues (Chowdhury 2000). MFIs were approached until
the predetermined number in each stratified sample agreed to participate. The NGO-MFIs were
located across the country, with both registered and unregistered NGO-MFIs operating in rural and
urban areas.
4 CDF, a nonprofit organization, and the National Association of Bangladesh Microfinance, were established in 1992 to provide
capacity, networking and advocacy, and building resource linkages between MFIs in Bangladesh. A survey is conducted
annually by CDF to gather MFIs’ financial data.
5 There were 107 unregistered MFIs that reported to CDF in 2012. However, there are more than 500 unregistered MFIs
working in Bangladesh without any formal recognition from the government or CDF (according to the CDF president).
6 It is interesting to note that, in more recent years, the MRA does not acknowledge the existence of unregulated MFIs.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2020, 8, 63 7 of 24
Table 1. Structured interview guide and client yes response frequencies.




(N = 200) Pearson Chi2 p-Value
% N % N %
1 Do you know the types of loans and other facilitiesavailable from your MFI? 36.0 29 20.4 94 47.0 25.470 0.000
2 Did loan officers/lenders explain to you the terms andconditions of the loan? 32.2 15 10.6 95 47.5 51.925 0.000
3 Do you know the interest rate (per month) on your loanand savings charged by and paid by your MFI? 58.5 0 0.00 200 100.0 342.000 0.000
4 Do you maintain any loan or savings passbook given byyour MFI? 72.2 69 48.6 178 89.0 67.588 0.000
5 Do loan officers/lenders give you a copy of thepromissory note for your records? 58.5 57 39.9 143 71.5 174.489 0.000
6 Can you get information about your loan and savingsfrom your branch office any working day? 59.7 12 8.5 192 96.0 264.448 0.000
7 Do you know about the fees, premium, and settlement ofclaim of your insurance service? 16.1 3 2.1 52 26.0 35.11 0.000
8 Do you have savings with your MFI? 71.4 45 31.7 199 99.5 186.773 0.000
9 Can you withdraw your savings (partially or fully) fromyour MFI (if your loan is cleared)? 98.0 135 95.1 200 100.0 10.065 0.002
10 Do you have any other voluntary savings in your MFI? 89.5 126 88.7 180 90.0 0.142 0.707
11 Do you know what your service charge is? 58.5 0 0.00 200 100.0 342.000 0.000
12 Do you earn any interest on your savings? 58.5 0 0.00 200 100.0 342.000 0.000
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Once cooperation from 149 MFIs was secured, the questionnaire was pre-forwarded for information,
and meetings were then arranged with the CEO/managing director of each MFI. Permission was
sought to visit NGO-MFI branch offices at client meeting times. Branch office names and locations
were publicly available from websites, MRA reports, or published MFI reports. A generic formal letter
of approval that introduced the researcher to branch office managers was sought and received from
each NGO-MFI executive.
On receipt of consent from each NGO-MFI with a letter of introduction, random sampling
was again used to select three branches, whereupon branch managers were approached by phone
until three from each NGO-MFI agreed to assist in recruiting clients for a 10–15 min interview by
introducing the researcher before a branch meeting. Thus, participating NGO-MFI executives had
no knowledge of, nor could wield any influence over, which branch managers were approached or
agreed to participate. The researcher then attended branch offices at pre-arranged times to recruit
clients and interviewed those willing. The response sheets were completely anonymous; with client
responses to both instrument and demographic questions were recorded by the researcher. All clients
were female, as is the norm in Bangladesh. For the registered MFIs, 71 percent were in urban areas.
For the unregistered MFIs, 65 percent were in urban areas. Thus, the urban–rural partition was similar
for both registered and unregistered NGO-MFIs.
5.2. Model Development
It was anticipated that, similar to the results of Kalra et al. (2015), responses to the 12 questions
related to consumer protection reported in Table 1 would need to be factor-analyzed with factor
scores substituted for the raw data due to high multicollinearity. For the testing of Hypothesis 1,
the dependent variable was represented by client protection factor scores. The hypothesis variable
was the regulatory status of the NGO-MFI. Since financial literacy and awareness of consumer issues
were expected to be positively associated with the presence of a client-owned microenterprise and the
client’s level of education, we included these demographic characteristics as control variables, and
tested the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation:
Consumer protection knowledge (Factor Scoresit) = β0 + β1Regulatedit + β2Microentit +
β3Educationit + εit
(1)
where for client i at time t:
Variable Pred. Dir. Definition and measure
Dependent Variable (Financial Literacy)
Factor Score(s) Factor analysis of client responses
Hypothesis Variable
Registered + Whether the client’s MFI is regulated (coded yes = 1, 0 otherwise)
Control Variables
Microent = + A self-declared client microenterprise exists (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0)
Education + The client has some schooling (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0)
For the testing of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, the factor scores and regulated status were
expected to be positively associated with client financial status. Client financial status was also expected
to be positively associated with client age, education, marital status, number of children, and owning a
microenterprise. Children often work and contribute to family income, so it was not clear in which
direction this variable may affect financial status.
Financial Statusit = β0 + β1Factor Score(s)it + β2Regulatedit + β3Ageit + β4Married + β5Childrenit
+ β6Microentit + β7Educationit + εit
(2)
where, for client i at time t, variables were defined and measured as per Equation (1), except for:
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Dependent Variable
Financial Status = Self-declared client annual income (Tk) (natural log)
Control
Variables
Age = − Client age in years
Married = + Client marital status (married, = 1, 0 otherwise [widowed, separated, single])
Children = ? Self-declared number of children
In estimating all models, we used robust regression clustering on client membership of a
specific NGO-MFI.
6. Results
The sampled 149 branch offices (89 and 60 registered and unregistered, respectively) of MFIs
from all parts of Bangladesh were visited to conduct client interviews during the five months from
November 2013 to March 2014. A total of 387 clients were interviewed (212 and 175 clients of registered
and unregistered NGO-MFIs, respectively), but some clients did not respond to all questions and 342
(88 percent) complete observations for 147 NGO-MFIs were used in the analysis (200 and 142 clients of
registered and unregistered MFIs, respectively).
6.1. Descriptive Statistics
In addition to the structured interview questions, Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for responses
to each question and whether or not there is a significant difference in affirmative responses by clients
of registered compared with unregistered NGO-MFIs. The Cronbach’s alpha for the 12 questions
was 0.878. However, for three questions, no clients of unregistered NGO-MFIs responded “Yes”.
These questions relate to Q3—participants’ knowledge of the interest rate (per month) on loans and
savings charged by their MFI; Q11—whether or not the service charge is known; and Q12—knowledge
of whether or not interest is earned on their savings. Consequently, significant Chi squared values
(p < 0.001) were recorded for the clients of regulated compared with nonregulated MFIs, as shown in
Table 1.
There are also significant Chi squared differences (p < 0.001) for “Yes” responses by clients of
registered (47 percent) and unregistered (26 percent) NGO-MFIs to Q1, concerning knowledge of
types of loans, Q2, concerning explanations by loan officers (48 and 11 percent, respectively), Q4,
concerning maintenance of a savings or passbook (68 and 49 percent, respectively), Q5, concerning
receipt of promissory notes (72 and 40 percent, respectively), Q6, concerning accessibility of loan and
savings information (96 and 9 percent, respectively), Q7 concerning knowledge of fees, premiums
and claims regarding insurance (26 and two percent, respectively), Q8, concerning knowledge of
savings (100 and 32 percent, respectively), Q9, concerning knowledge of ability to withdraw savings
(100 and 95 percent, respectively), and Q10, concerning knowledge of other, voluntary savings (99 and
32 percent, respectively).
Table 2 reports the Pearson’s correlations between responses to questions 1–12. As was
anticipated, some of the Pearson’s correlations were unitary (e.g., Q11 and Q12), with others very
high (e.g., 0.879 between Q3 and Q6 and 0.739 between Q3 and Q9) and correlations with the variable
registered/unregistered were perfect in some cases, meaning that a singular matrix due to high
multicollinearity in the factor analysis will not allow estimation of the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO)
measure of sampling adequacy. Hence, responses to questions 3, 11, and 12 were omitted. Without
these three questions, the Cronbach’s alpha for the remaining nine questions was reduced to 0.720,
which is considered adequate.
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6.2. Factor Analysis
As mentioned, to reduce the number of variables, the nine questions reported in Table 1 where
responses were not perfectly predictive of MFI registration status were factor analyzed (i.e., questions
1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10). Only observations for which all data were present and also met
the regression variable requirements are included, resulting in a sample of 342 client observations.
The Table 2 correlations between client responses to these questions reveal that a substantial number
are above 0.30 and the inverse correlation matrix reported in Appendix A—Table A1 confirm that
most correlations among the variables are significant and the negative partial (anti-image) covariances
and correlations reported in Appendix A—Table A2 reveal only two correlations above 0.70 (Q6 and
Q8). Hence, the responses are considered suitable for factor analysis (Hair et al. 2014, p. 101).
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.651 (Appendix A—Table A3, which is
low (Hair et al. 2014, p. 102), but it needs to be remembered that responses to three questions that
perfectly predicted NGO-MFI registration status were omitted from the analysis and Bartlett’s test
of sphericity, which provides the statistical significance that the correlation matrix has significant
correlations among at and a Chi-square of 1106.19 (p < 0.001) (Appendix A—Table A3), enabling the
factor analysis to proceed.
The scree plot (Appendix A—Figure A1), communalities (Appendix A—Table A4), and eigenvalues
greater than one (Appendix A—Table A5) (Hair et al. 2014, p. 107) suggested that three factors capture
the variability in the responses best. The lowest communality was 0.495 and the next lowest 0.520
with the rest above 0.6, so the proportion of variance explained for each variable explained by the
components was acceptable to proceed. Together, these three factors explained over 69 percent of the
variance in the client responses with 32 percent for Factor 1, 21 percent for Factor 2, and 16 percent for
Factor 3.
The component matrix (Appendix A—Table A6) plus the reproduced correlations
(Appendix A—Table A7) for the nine questions confirm the earlier outcomes. An oblimin rotation with
Kaiser normalization was chosen since the factors were expected to be correlated (Hair et al. 2014).
Table 3 presents the rotated (oblimin7) principal components analysis loadings for the client responses
to the included questions. The structure matrix is reported in Appendix A—Table A8. The loadings
are all above 0.50 with at least two questions loading on each component, so a simple structure results,
as was the aim. The three components were deemed to represent “Personalized information about
savings/loan basics”, “General information about loans”, and “Knowledge of access to savings”.
For the first theme, “Personalized information about savings/loan basics”, the items relate to the
client’s knowledge about personal financial information, such as their loan/savings. Client responses
to questions consisted of “interest charged on their loans and savings account by respective MFIs”,
“access to information from MFIs during business hours”, “having passbook linked with their account”,
and providing receipts to clients for financial transactions by respective MFIs.
In the second theme, “General information about Loans”, the items relate to client knowledge
about their financial service provider. The questions were focused on the types of loan available,
fees premium, settlements of claims for insurance (if any), and whether or not the loan officer explained
the terms and conditions of their loan. For the third theme, “Knowledge of access to savings”, the items
relate to the clients’ knowledge about their rights to access their savings and their knowledge of the
voluntary nature of savings.
7 Varimax rotation results in loading of identical questions on each factor.
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MFI = Yes Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Q1 0.273 ***
Q2 0.390 *** 0.710 ***
Q3 # 1.000*** 0.273 *** 0.390 ***
Q4 0.445 *** −0.011 0.189 ** 0.445 ***
Q5 0.714 *** −0.117 * −0.038 0.714 *** 0.526 ***
Q6 0.879 *** 0.244 *** 0.286 *** 0.879 *** 0.448 *** 0.661 ***
Q7 0.320 *** 0.402 *** 0.465 *** 0.320 *** 0.236 *** 0.000 0.263 ***
Q8 0.739 *** 0.165 * 0.270 *** 0.739 *** 0.228 *** 0.524 *** 0.612 *** 0.225 ***
Q9 0.172 ** 0.108 * 0.100 0.172 ** 0.233 *** 0.123 * 0.176 ** 0.063 −0.092
Q10 0.020 0.078 0.053 0.020 0.000 0.078 0.029 −0.083 −0.028 0.421 ***
Q11 # 1.000 *** 0.273 *** 0.390 *** 1.000 *** 0.445 *** 0.714 *** 0.879 *** 0.320 *** 0.739 *** 0.172 ** 0.020
Q12 # 1.000*** 0.273 *** 0.390 *** 1.000 *** 0.445 *** 0.714 *** 0.879 *** 0.320 *** 0.739 *** 0.172 ** 0.020 1.000 1.000
Registered microfinance institutions (MFI) = 1, Refer to Table 1 for Questions 1–12. # Variables with unitary correlations are not included in regressions. *** Significant at p < 0.001,
** significant at p < 0.05, * significant at p < 0.10.
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Knowledge service charge Omitted–perfectlypredicts
Knowledge interest rate Omitted—perfectlypredicts
Knowledge savings interest Omitted—perfectlypredicts
Receive promissory note 0.893
Loan info from branch 0.840
Knowledge about savings 0.722
Maintain loan pass book 0.676
Knowledge terms of loans 0.881
Knowledge loan type 0.876
Knowledge of fees, premiums,
and claims for insurance services 0.692
Knowledge withdrawing savings 0.843
Knowledge voluntary savings 0.809
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.720. Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: oblimin with Kaiser
normalization. Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy = 0.651.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics and tests of difference for demographic variables for clients of
registered and unregistered MFIs and the factor scores. The mean annual income was 42,611 taka, with a
significant difference (p < 0.000) between the mean for 200 registered NGO-MFI clients (53,724 taka) and
that for 142 clients of unregistered NGO-MFIs (27,592 taka). The factor score for Factor 1 “Knowledge
about personalized information about savings/loan basics” for the full sample was −0.018, with a
significant difference (p < 0.000) between the means for registered (0.801) and unregistered (−1.171)
NGO-MFI clients. For Factor 2, “General knowledge about savings/loan”, the overall mean was −0.037,
with a significant difference (p < 0.000) between means for registered (0.275) and unregistered MFI
clients (−0.475). For Factor 3, “Knowledge of access to savings”, overall, the mean was −0.004, with an
insignificant difference between means for registered and unregistered NGO-MFI clients.
The mean age of clients was 39.9 years, with no significant difference for clients of registered
versus unregistered NGO-MFIs. The mean number of children was 4.5 overall, with means of 3.7 and
5.7 for registered and unregistered MFI clients, respectively, which is a significant difference (p < 0.000).
For the dichotomous variables, overall 59 percent of clients were married, with a significant
difference (p < 0.01) for clients of registered (50 percent) and unregistered (70 percent) NGO-MFIs.
In terms of microenterprise ownership, 66 percent overall owned a microenterprise, at 83 and 42 percent
for registered and unregistered MFIs, respectively, a difference that is significant (p < 0.000). In terms
of education, there was a significant difference (p < 0.000) between clients of the two types of MFI: 77
and 33 percent of clients of registered and unregistered NGO-MFIs, respectively, had some schooling.
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics.
Variables
All MFIs Registered MFIs Unregistered MFIs
N = 342 N = 200 (58.5%) N = 142 (41.5%)
Continuous Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max IndependentSamples t-Test
Annual income (taka) 42,611 53,724 18,611 5400 114,000 27,592 11,441 6000 78,000 −14.598 ***
Fac1-Personalized info about savings/loan basics 0.000 0.717 0.576 −0.555 1.249 −1.010 0.439 −1.711 0.360 −30.055 ***
Fac2-General info about Loans 0.000 0.273 1.191 −0.997 2.099 −0.385 0.403 −0.755 0.307 −6.332 ***
Fac3-Knowledge of access to savings 0.000 0.016 0.562 −1.731 0.659 −0.022 1.404 −5.826 0.688 −0.347
Client age 39.892 38.955 13.967 16.000 86.000 41.211 11.966 21.000 79.000 1.561
Number of children 4.538 3.715 2.405 0 13 5.697 2.173 0 10 7.814 ***
Dichotomous Chi2
Married (1 = yes, 0 = no) 59.1% 51.5% 0 1 69.7% 0 1 11.399 **
Microenterprise (1 = yes, 0 = no) 65.5% 82.5% 0 1 41.5% 0 1 61.622 ***
Education (1 = yes, 0 = no) 58.8% 77.0% 0 1 33.1% 0 1 66.052 ***
Fac1 = Score—Personalized info about savings/loan basics; Fac2 = Score—General information about loans; Fac3 = Score—Knowledge of access to savings; MFI Status = Client membership
of registered or unregistered MFI (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0); Age = Client age; Children = Self-declared number of clients’ children; Married—coded yes = 1, otherwise 0; Microenterprise
= Self-declared client microenterprise exists (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0); Education = Client has some education (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0). *** Significant at p < 0.001; ** significant at
p < 0.05.
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6.3. Pearson’s Correlations
Table 5 reports the Pearson’s correlations for the 342 client observations between registered and
unregistered NGO-MFI members’ financial literacy as represented by the factor scores, as well as
income, age, number of children, and education level. There were significant positive correlations
between the three factors [Factor 1 “Knowledge about personalized information about savings/loan
basics”, Factor 2, “General knowledge about savings/loan” and Factor 3, “Knowledge of access to
savings”] (r = 0.969, r = 0.376, and r = 0.069, respectively) and the status (registered/unregistered) of
their NGO-MFIs. It is important to note that Factor 1, “Knowledge of personalized information about
loan/savings”, was almost perfectly correlated with registered MFI status, and it is likely that this lack
of variability will cause problems with multivariate estimation. None of the correlations between the
three factors themselves was higher than 0.240.
Strong positive correlations were noted between NGO-MFI status and clients’ number of children,
education, and microenterprise ownership. Client income was significantly correlated with the three
factors (r = 0.539, r = 0.266, and r = 0.145, respectively), and also with NGO-MFI status (r = 0.638).
In terms of independent variables, client age, as is to be expected, was highly correlated (r = 0.660)
with the number of children and with education (r = 0.425). None of the other correlations between the
independent variables was higher than 0.400, and so should not present multicollinearity concerns.
6.4. Multivariate Results
OLS Regression results for the test of Hypothesis 1 are reported in Table 6. This test regressed the
hypothesis and control variables on each of the factor scores and the total factor score. The F statistics
for all three models were significant, and the R2 ranged from 75 percent for Factor 1, to 15 percent
for Factor 2, and only 3 percent for Factor 3. For the total factor score as the dependent variable,
the R2 was 50 percent. The regressions were robust, controlling for client observations attached to the
same NGO-MFI. Notably, MFI status (registered/unregistered) was highly significant (p < 0.001) and
positive for Factors 1 and 2 and the total factor score. That is, client financial literacy and awareness
were higher for registered MFIs compared with unregistered MFIs controlling for education and
microenterprise ownership. Hence, Hypothesis 1 was supported. Having some schooling (education)
was significant (p < 0.001) only for Factor 2. Client ownership of microenterprises was significant
(p < 0.01) in explaining all three factors and their total (p < 0.05), but was negatively significant for
Factor 2.
For the tests of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, robust OLS regression was used, with results
reported in Table 7. Total factor score was used, due to the high correlation between registered NGO-MFI
client membership and Factor 1 scores8. Again, the robust regression fit well, with significant F statistics
and with a model R2 of 45 percent. The total factor score was significant (p < 0.01), supporting
Hypothesis 2, as was belonging to a registered NGO-MFI (p < 0.001), thus supporting Hypothesis 3.
Amongst the control variables, the number of children alone was significant (p < 0.05) and positive,
indicating that children in this setting, on average, add to family income rather than detract from it.
Age was negative but not significant, and, hence, this direction needs to be interpreted with caution.
8 When the three factor scores are included as variables in their own right rather than as a total in the regression, the highest
variance inflation factor is over 6, and when the omitted items from the factor analysis are not excluded, it increases to
over 30.
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Table 5. Pearson’s correlations (N = 342).
Variables MFI StatusRegistered Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor Total Age Education Married Children Micro-Enterprise
Factor 1 0.852 ***
Factor 2 0.325 *** 0.000
Factor 3 0.019 0.000 0.000
Factor Tot 0.691 *** 0.577 *** 0.577 *** 0.577 ***
Age −0.084 0.076 −0.242 *** 0.079 −0.050
Education 0.440 *** 0.390 *** 0.307 *** −0.019 0.392 *** −0.425 ***
Married −0.183 ** −0.236 *** 0.070 0.062 −0.061 −0.237 *** 0.148 **
Children −0.390 *** −0.270 *** −0.271 *** 0.110 * −0.249 *** 0.660 *** −0.390 *** −0.061
Microenterprise 0.425 *** 0.519 *** 0.053 0.140 * 0.411 *** −0.018 0.267 *** −0.141 ** −0.173 **
Financial status 0.638 *** 0.539 *** 0.266 *** 0.145 ** 0.549 *** −0.057 0.342 *** −0.036 −0.179 ** 0.314 ***
MFI Status = Client membership of registered or unregistered MFIs (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0); Fac1 = Score—Personalized info about savings/loan basics; Fac2 = Score—General
information about Loans; Fac3 = Knowledge of access to savings; Age = Client age; Education = Client has some schooling (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0); Children = Self-declared number of
children; Microent = Self-declared microenterprise exists (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0); Financial Status = Self-declared client annual income (taka). *** Significant at p < 0.001; ** significant
at p < 0.01; * significant at p < 0.05.
Table 6. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with dependent variable client financial literacy factors (Hypothesis 1).




Savings/Loan Basics General info about Loans Knowledge of Access to Savings Client Financial Literacy
Coef. Std. Err. t, P > t Coef. Std. Err. t, P > t Coef. Std. Err. T, P > t Coef. Std. Err. T, P > t
Registered 1.562 0.074 21.16 *** 0.573 0.107 5.34 *** −0.059 0.127 −0.47 2.075 0.148 14.04 ***
Education 0.001 0.067 0.01 0.438 0.115 3.81 *** −0.102 0.142 −0.72 0.336 0.177 1.90
Microenterprise 0.403 0.078 5.18 *** −0.261 0.096 −2.72 ** 0.348 0.117 2.96 ** 0.491 0.146 3.36 **
_cons −1.178 0.058 −20.31 *** −0.422 0.062 −6.76 *** −0.133 0.145 −0.992 −1.732 0.161 −10.77 ***
F Stat 296.56 *** 18.21 *** 8.27 *** 120.63 ***
R2 0.757 0.154 0.024 0.501
Root MSE 0.495 0.925 0.993 1.229
N 342 342 342 342
No. of Clusters 147 147 147 147
Fac1 = Score—Personalized info about savings/loan basics; Fac2 = Score—General information about loans; Fac3 = Score—Knowledge of access to savings; MFI Status = Client membership
of registered or unregistered MFI (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0); Age = Client age; Children = Self-declared number of children; Microent = Self-declared microenterprise exists (coded yes = 1,
otherwise 0); Education = Client has some schooling (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0). *** = Significant at p < 0.001; **significant at p < 0.01.
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Table 7. OLS regression with dependent variable financial status (Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3)
(N = 342).
Dependent Variable: LnIncome Coef. Robust Std. Err t P > |t|
Financial Literacy (total factor score) 0.054 0.019 2.820 **
Registered 0.574 0.075 7.620 ***
Age −0.003 0.003 −0.940
Married 0.070 0.043 1.630
No. Children 0.031 0.013 2.430 **
Education 0.047 0.054 0.880
Microenterprise 0.033 0.047 0.690
_cons 10.072 0.099 101.360 ***
F (9, 146) 38.73 ***
R2 0.446
N 342
Number of clusters 147
Highest VIF 2.40 without robust
Financial Status = Natural log of self-declared client annual income (taka); Total Factor Score = Sum of Fac1
(score—personalized info about savings/loan basics) + Fac2 (score—general information about loans) + Fac3
(score—knowledge of access to savings); MFI Status = Client membership of registered or unregistered MFI (coded
registered yes = 1, otherwise 0); Age = Client age; Married = Client’s marital status (coded 1 if married, 0 if separated,
widowed, divorced, or single); Children = Self-declared number of children; Microenterprise = Self-declared
microenterprise exists (coded yes = 1, otherwise 0). VIF = Variance inflation factor. *** Significant at p < 0.001;
** significant at p < 0.01.
6.5. Robustness Tests
As a robustness test for Hypothesis 1, a financial literacy index comprising the questions listed
in Table 1 with clients’ yes responses were used to create a score between 0–12 and analyzed using
truncated regression for the same client sample. That is, instead of factor analyzing, each question was
equally weighted and the total of yes responses is used as the dependent variable that is truncated at a
maximum score of 12. The mean score for the full sample is 7.01 with that for the regulated MFIs is 9.725
and for unregulated NGO-MFIs is 3.20, a difference that is significant at p < 0.001. The untabulated
truncated regression results based on 342 observations clustered on NGO-MFI identity confirm (refer
Table 6) the factor analysis results. The model fits well with an R2 of 38.52 per cent. The registered
MFI indicator was significant at p < 0.001, consistent with the total factor score as the dependent
variable analysis. The variable representing clients with some schooling was significant at p < 0.001
and microenterprise ownership was significant at p < 0.05.
Similarly, the same financial literacy index was used as a robustness test for Hypothesis 2 and
Hypothesis 3 with income as the dependent variable. The OLS results confirmed (refer Table 7) the
significance of the financial literacy index (p < 0.01) and registered NGO-MFI indicator (p < 0.05) in
explaining client income, with an R2 of 43.33 per cent. No other variables were significant. Both of
these results confirm the primary findings.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
In many countries, consumer protection in financial services is shared among multiple financial
and nonfinancial regulators and enforcement bodies (Brix and McKee 2010). However, regulation
alone cannot protect the interests of consumers and enhance consumer awareness and prevent market
misconduct (Brix and McKee 2010; Beltran 2007). Self-regulatory initiatives, consumer awareness,
and financial literacy programs can play a vital role.
Solli et al. (2011) claimed that the planning process for a new regulatory regime should
require attention to consumer awareness and rights and knowledge about financial products. Hence,
microfinance regulation, especially concerning client protection, is critical to achieving the social
objectives of a microfinance program. Brix and McKee (2010) emphasized the need for regulation
in countries where microfinance is growing rapidly, and unregulated microfinance has come under
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2020, 8, 63 17 of 24
critical scrutiny in the press, due to coverage of over-indebtedness by MFI borrowers. Clients should
understand their rights and entitlements from the relevant financial institution (Beltran 2007).
The importance of regulation in the financial knowledge and awareness of MFI clients (of both
nonprofit and commercial MFIs) can be inferred from this study. This importance is relevant for
conventional banking contexts in developed economies (e.g., (Lee et al. 2019)) and so the result from
this study in a microfinance and developing economy context is not surprising; however, it is rare for
this issue to be examined in a microcredit context. From the results, we can conclude that the regulation
and appropriate guidelines for MFIs’ conduct can play a significant role in increasing their clients’
financial literacy and awareness of their rights. Furthermore, this higher knowledge and awareness
is positively associated with clients’ financial intermediation. This study implies that the planning
process for reforms in a microfinance context should focus on how to increase consumer awareness
and financial capability, particularly for women, rather than focusing only on the regulatory function
of the process.
Having knowledge about weekly loan payments alone cannot be considered as sound financial
literacy or awareness by clients. Access to more complex products, such as insurance, and understanding
of interest require a higher level of awareness. With knowledge of the loan, the interest rate, savings, and
insurance, clients should have the capability to budget in order to repay in installments. According to
Tiwari et al. (2008), financial literacy training should not only aim for a change in levels of knowledge
about financial products, but also a behavioral change. During financial training, clients should be
given information by their MFIs that they are able to understand and use. Furthermore, while not
an issue for this study, technology-oriented services are increasingly presenting a cyber and money
laundering risk, which requires greater sophistication in the education of both MFI personnel and their
clients (Shinozaki et al. 2017).
These findings lead to the conclusion that economists, social scientists, policymakers, governments,
and development agencies should make pragmatic efforts to increase the knowledge and awareness
of MFI clients. Further, these pragmatic efforts should especially focus on women since women
are the best recipients of microfinance (Lee et al. 2019). This should be one of the key focus points
for the overall planning process for any reform of regulation. However, in spite of the evidence
presented of positive outcomes for clients of regulated NGO-MFIs, our study indicated that some clients
prefer unregistered nonprofit NGO-MFIs over registered NGO-MFIs as their financial institutions.
An important observation from interview evidence gathered for a wider study revealed that the most
vulnerable and poor borrowers tend to be served by unregistered NGO-MFIs. An executive of an
unregulated NGO-MFI provided one rationale for this:
“Loan defaulters from other large MFIs and overlapping customers who are disqualified from all
registered MFIs are the poorest segment of clients. They do not have any source for accessing credit.
As a result, many of them engage themselves with destructive activities like social crimes and domestic
violence and become a burden on society. We support these types of clients by providing them training
and education and giving them loans so that they can regain their confidence and become valuable
citizens of the country”. (MFI No. 133)
It is, therefore, important to note that the outreach of MFIs does not necessarily bring the welfare
of MFI clients to the fore, ostensibly the primary goal of microfinance. Previous research has also found
gaps between the goals of MFIs and unlawful and inappropriate pressure, violence, and abuse of clients
by loan collectors and MFI borrowing group members (Banerjee and Jackson 2017; Bateman 2012;
Maîtrot 2018). Microfinance practice needs to be understood in the context of the totality of the social,
economic, and other financial structures that control the life of the poor (Dattasharma et al. 2016).
The double bottom-line goal of microfinance can be better achieved by ensuring strong monitoring
of MFIs and discouraging any type of malpractice by MFI staff in their dealings with clients. This study’s
results imply that the welfare of MFI clients can be achieved not only through appropriate monitoring
and guidance, but also through a focus on increasing consumer awareness and financial capability.
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To generalize the findings from this study, similar research would need to target the microfinance
sector in other countries. A randomized control study of client financial knowledge and awareness
before and after regulatory reforms in the microfinance sector would be needed before causation can
be attributed. However, this study found a strong association between NGO-MFI clients’ consumer
protection knowledge and client financial status. Whether the clients of registered MFIs had this greater
knowledge before becoming members or gained their knowledge from other MFIs cannot be discerned.
This study has several limitations. The number of clients questioned for each MFI was small and
these clients may differ in their characteristics from other clients. The number of MFIs, particularly
unregulated MFIs, is also relatively small but adequate for the model applied. Future research could
expand on the sample size for both clients and MFIs and examine financial literacy in other contexts to
investigate what other institutional settings might influence knowledge of this type.
In terms of future research, examining interventions by MFIs or other organizations that provide
both language and numeracy training could be examined, since it could be that unregistered MFIs do
not require the same level of document completion by clients, which makes them attractive to those
with low levels of general literacy.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Inverse of Correlation Matrix (N = 342).
Q6 Q5 Q8 Q4 Q2 Q1 Q7 Q9 Q10
Q6 2.684 −1.275 −0.803 −0.218 −0.072 −0.520 −0.196 −0.334 0.170
Q5 −1.275 2.750 −0.717 −0.889 0.487 0.268 0.351 0.024 −0.226
Q8 −0.803 −0.717 1.965 0.328 −0.441 0.140 −0.186 0.387 −0.033
Q4 −0.218 −0.889 0.328 1.736 −0.532 0.439 −0.324 −0.271 0.166
Q2 −0.072 0.487 −0.441 −0.532 2.452 −1.467 −0.317 0.011 −0.093
Q1 −0.520 0.268 0.140 0.439 −1.467 2.293 −0.240 −0.080 −0.091
Q7 −0.196 0.351 −0.186 −0.324 −0.317 −0.240 1.428 −0.045 0.146
Q9 −0.334 0.024 0.387 −0.271 0.011 −0.080 −0.045 1.406 −0.572
Q10 0.170 −0.226 −0.033 0.166 −0.093 −0.091 0.146 −0.572 1.277
Q1 Do you know the types of loans and other facilities available from your MFI?, Q2 Did loan officers/lenders
explain to you the terms and conditions of the loan?, Q3 Do you know the interest rate (per month) on your loan and
savings charged by and paid by your MFI?, Q4 Do you maintain any loan or savings passbook given by your MFI?,
Q5 Do loan officers/lenders give you a copy of the promissory note for your records?, Q6 Can you get information
about your loan and savings from your branch office any working day?, Q7 Do you know about the fees, premium,
and settlement of claim of your insurance service?, Q9 Can you withdraw your savings (partially or fully) from your
MFI (if your loan is cleared)?, Q10 Do you have any other voluntary savings in your MFI?
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Table A2. Anti-image Matrices (N = 342).
Q6 Q5 Q8 Q4 Q2 Q1 Q7 Q9 Q10
Anti-image
Covariance
Q6 0.373 −0.173 −0.152 −0.047 −0.011 −0.085 −0.051 −0.088 0.050
Q5 −0.173 0.364 −0.133 −0.186 0.072 0.042 0.089 0.006 −0.064
Q8 −0.152 −0.133 0.509 0.096 −0.091 0.031 −0.066 0.140 −0.013
Q4 −0.047 −0.186 0.096 0.576 −0.125 0.110 −0.131 −0.111 0.075
Q2 −0.011 0.072 −0.091 −0.125 0.408 −0.261 −0.090 0.003 −0.030
Q1 −0.085 0.042 0.031 0.110 −0.261 0.436 −0.073 −0.025 −0.031
Q7 −0.051 0.089 −0.066 −0.131 −0.090 −0.073 0.700 −0.022 0.080
Q9 −0.088 0.006 0.140 −0.111 0.003 −0.025 −0.022 0.711 −0.319
Q10 0.050 −0.064 −0.013 0.075 −0.030 −0.031 0.080 −0.319 0.783
Anti-image
Correlation
Q6 0.738 a −0.469 −0.349 −0.101 −0.028 −0.210 −0.100 −0.172 0.092
Q5 −0.469 0.641 a −0.308 −0.407 0.187 0.107 0.177 0.012 −0.121
Q8 −0.349 −0.308 0.705 a 0.177 −0.201 0.066 −0.111 0.233 −0.021
Q4 −0.101 −0.407 0.177 0.624 a −0.258 0.220 −0.206 −0.174 0.111
Q2 −0.028 0.187 −0.201 −0.258 0.624 a −0.618 −0.169 0.006 −0.053
Q1 −0.210 0.107 0.066 0.220 −0.618 0.604 a −0.132 −0.044 −0.053
Q7 −0.100 0.177 −0.111 −0.206 −0.169 −0.132 0.784 a −0.032 0.108
Q9 −0.172 0.012 0.233 −0.174 0.006 −0.044 −0.032 0.510 a −0.427
Q10 0.092 −0.121 −0.021 0.111 −0.053 −0.053 0.108 −0.427 0.461 a
a Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA). Refer to Table A1 for question content.
Table A3. KMO and Bartlett’s Test.
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.651
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Table A5. Total Variance Explained.
Component












1 2.897 32.194 32.194 2.897 32.194 32.194 2.635
2 1.865 20.718 52.912 1.865 20.718 52.912 2.287
3 1.456 16.177 69.089 1.456 16.177 69.089 1.491
4 0.891 9.902 78.991
5 0.571 6.344 85.335
6 0.510 5.669 91.003
7 0.352 3.915 94.918
8 0.235 2.607 97.525
9 0.223 2.475 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings
cannot be added to obtain a total variance. See Table A1 for question content.
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Table A7. Reproduced Correlations.
Q6 Q5 Q8 Q4 Q2 Q1 Q7 Q9 Q10
Reproduced
Correlation
Q6 0.776 a 0.706 0.657 0.594 0.328 0.205 0.327 0.169 0.034
Q5 0.706 0.840 a 0.580 0.608 −0.059 −0.186 0.023 0.164 0.058
Q8 0.657 0.580 0.631 a 0.462 0.280 0.166 0.316 −0.084 −0.192
Q4 0.594 0.608 0.462 0.495 a 0.143 0.049 0.149 0.242 0.140
Q2 0.328 −0.059 0.280 0.143 0.792 a 0.772 0.626 0.139 0.050
Q1 0.205 −0.186 0.166 0.049 0.772 0.775 a 0.593 0.147 0.076
Q7 0.327 0.023 0.316 0.149 0.626 0.593 0.520 a 0.007 −0.071
Q9 0.169 0.164 −0.084 0.242 0.139 0.147 0.007 0.734 a 0.682
Q10 0.034 0.058 −0.192 0.140 0.050 0.076 −0.071 0.682 0.654 a
Residual b
Q6 −0.045 −0.045 −0.146 −0.042 0.039 −0.064 0.007 −0.005
Q5 −0.045 −0.056 −0.082 0.021 0.070 −0.023 −0.042 0.020
Q8 −0.045 −0.056 −0.234 −0.010 −0.001 −0.092 −0.007 0.164
Q4 −0.146 −0.082 −0.234 0.047 −0.060 0.087 −0.009 −0.140
Q2 −0.042 0.021 −0.010 0.047 −0.062 −0.160 −0.040 0.003
Q1 0.039 0.070 −0.001 −0.060 −0.062 −0.191 −0.038 0.002
Q7 −0.064 −0.023 −0.092 0.087 −0.160 −0.191 0.056 −0.013
Q9 0.007 −0.042 −0.007 −0.009 −0.040 −0.038 0.056 −0.260
Q10 −0.005 0.020 0.164 −0.140 0.003 0.002 −0.013 −0.260
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a Reproduced communalities; b Residuals are computed
between observed and reproduced correlations. There are 16 (44.0%) nonredundant residuals with absolute values
greater than 0.05. See Table A1 for question content.












Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
See Table A1 for question content.
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